We show that the extensional ordering of the sequential functionals of pure type 3, e.g. as defined via game semantics [2, 4], is not cpo-enriched. This shows that this model does not equal Milner's [9] fully abstract model for P CF .
Introduction
In [14] , Scott defined the logic LCF , a logic for computable typed functionals. He constructed a"mathematical" model for LCF , a construction that led to the discovery of domain theory. By the Scott model we will mean the hierarchy of algebraic domains constructed in [14] . [14] remained a famous, unpublished manuscript for many years, but was later published as an historical document [15] . LCF has its root in Platek's thesis [11] and the work on continuous functionals initiated by Kleene [6] and Kreisel [7] . Platek observed that nondeterministic OR, and equivalently, the nondeterministic conditional ⊃ nd are not captured by this calculus. These objects will be present in Scott's model, but undefinable in his language for LCF . In [12] Plotkin viewed LCF as a programming language P CF . P CF is essentially typed λ-calculus with constants for fixed point operators for each type. P CF is given with its λ-calculus operational semantics and a denotational semantics using Scott's model. In this paper we will let P CF be the special version where an elementary calculus for the algebra on the natural numbers and the booleans is integrated. In the technical part we have to assume some basic familiarity with P CF . Adding a constant for the conditional ⊃ nd with a nondeterministic evaluation procedure, Plotkin showed that all finitary objects in Scott's model are definable. Plotkin also showed that there are computable objects that are not P CF -definable relative to ⊃ nd , i.e. in the calculus known as P CF
Given P CF or a similar system, two closed terms T 1 and T 2 of type σ will be called observationally equivalent if for all terms M [x] of base type, where x is the only free variable and has type σ, either both M [T 1 ] and M [T 2 ] evaluate to the same normal form or neither evaluate to a normal form at all. A model for P CF or the similar system is called fully abstract if terms that are observationally equivalent will be interpreted as the same object in the model. Then Scott's model is not fully abstract for P CF , but for P CF + .
Milner [9] constructed a typed hierarchy of algebraic domains that served as a fully abstract model for P CF . Moreover he showed that up to isomorphism there will be only one such model. Milner's model is constructed as a kind of term model. The natural question was then if there is a more conceptually well based construction of Milner's model. This not very precise problem was known as the fully abstraction problem.
Several attempts have been made to solve this problem. Most relevant for this paper are the game-semantical approaches in Abramsky, Jagadeesan and Malacaria [2] and independently in Hyland and Ong [4] . In both papers, the sequential functionals are constructed in two guises, as intensional and as extensional objects. The finitary and intensional sequential functionals are the functionals realized by finite strategies or dialogues. The finitary and extensional functionals will be the compacts in Milner's model. These are characterized via the extensional ordering of the intensional finitary functionals. The remaining problem, first mentioned in Hyland and Ong [4] , but also pointed out by Plotkin in [13] , was if the infinitary objects in Milner's model could be obtained directly from one of the infinitary sequential functionals, or if the extensional collapse of the sequential functionals from [2] or [4] is a proper subset of Milner's model.
The main result of this paper is the solution to this remaining problem. We will show via one example that the extensional collapse of the sequential functionals is not an algebraic domain, constructing an unbounded increasing sequence. This shows that Milner's model still is too rich and, though we will not give the proof, it will actually contain a computable object of type 3 that is not P CF -definable, even relative to a total function of type 1.
The technical level of this paper is rather low, and the reader will not need much background from domain theory or computability theory in general. Further background in domain theory can be obtained from many sources, e.g. from Abramsky and Jung [1] , Stoltenberg-Hansen & al. [16] or Amadio and Curien [3] . The latter also provides a more than sufficient background on P CF .
Preliminaries
Sometimes the objects in a typed hierarchy will be defined intensionally, e.g. via the algorithms for them. Then we may, by recursion on the type σ, define an equivalence relation ≈ σ where ≈ 0 is the 'denotes the same object'-relation on the base type, and
for higher types. This will induce an equivalence relation on the set of intensional objects. The equivalence classes at each type may be viewed as functionals of the same type, and it is this functional hierarchy we call the extensional collapse. In the cases considered here, the base type will contain an object representing the 'undefined', and will then be ordered in the standard way. We order the function spaces of the extensional collapse using the pointwise ordering inductively. This is what we call the extensional ordering.
There are various equivalent approaches to the sequential functionals, the AJMgames in [2] , the HON -games in [4] , P CF Ω (i.e. special P CF with extra oracles for all partial f : N → N) and Kleene's S1 − S9 interpreted over the Scott model and relativized to all partial functions f : N → N. In all cases, we will be interested in the extensional typed hierarchy.
The two game-theoretical models are models for P CF Ω , and by Theorem 8.1 in [4] , each extensional functional definable by a game will be P CF Ω -definable. Thus in order to show that the extensional ordering of the sequential functionals is not an algebraically closed domain, it suffices to show that the set of P CF Ω -definable functionals of pure type 3 contains an unbounded increasing sequence.
Ulrich Berger observed that modulo the fact that Kleene's S1−S9 are restricted to the pure types, interpreting S1 − S9 over the Scott model is equivalent to P CF . The argument is originally due to Platek [11] , and may be found in Moldestad [10] . Berger showed that the argument from [11] and [10] is valid in the continuous case as well. Thus an alternative approach to our main result would be to prove that the set of Scott-functionals of pure type 3 computable in S1−S9 relative to some partial function on N contains an increasing, unbounded sequence. This was actually the approach first taken, and for readers familiar with S1 − S9-computability this approach may be even more transparent. However, since the majority of the potential readers are likely to be more familiar with P CF than with S1 − S9, we choose P CF as our platform.
Remark 1 Using the characterization of sequential finitary functionals in e.g. Hyland and Ong [4] it is easy to show that the least upper bound of an increasing sequence of finitary sequential functionals of type 2 is itself sequential.
In this paper we do not need the precise definition of finitary sequential objects. The functionals we construct will be extensional. The type-3 functionals explicitly defined are proved to be sequential by providing an algorithm for them. The functionals F of pure type 2 that we construct will satisfy one of two properties:
1. There is a finite partial function τ from N to N such that F (f ) terminates if and only if τ f .
2. There are two inconsistent finite partial functions σ and τ from N to N such that F (f ) terminates if and only if σ f or τ f .
In both cases F is trivially sequential.
The only technical property of sequential functionals of type 3 that we will need is In the final section we will show that our construction also shows that the minimal extensional model for P CF + Ω , i.e. P CF Ω extended with a constant for ⊃ nd , is not algebraically closed. Mainly because it simplifies the notation of the proof we will use the following definition:
We will also briefly discuss a problem related to the continuous existential quantifier ∃ ω defined by Definition 2
where tt and f f are the two truth values.
An example
We will let σ and τ with indices denote finite partial functions on N, f an arbitrary partial function on N. We let F (with indices) be sequential functionals of pure type 2, and Φ, Ψ with indices will denote sequential finitary functionals of pure type 3. We will explicitly define finitary functionals F 0 , F 1 , . . . where F 0 will be inconsistent with F n for n > 0 while F n and F m will be consistent when n > 0 and m > 0. We will then prove the existence of sequential functionals Φ n such that
The idea behind our example is to ensure that the computation of Φ n (F 0 ) always will require n +1 instances of functional applications independent of which algorithm for Φ n we choose. Thus there will be no way to uniformly bound them all by one sequential functional.
Definition 3 Let
τ 0 (0) = 1 and τ 0 (n) = ⊥ for n = 0.
We see that τ 0 and σ n are consistent when 1 ≤ n so F 0 and F n are inconsistent. If 1 ≤ n and 1 ≤ m, then F n and F m are consistent. We will also make use of the observation that if 1 ≤ n, 1 ≤ m and n = m, then σ n and σ m are inconsistent.
Lemma 2 Each F n is sequential.
The proof is trivial.
Lemma 3 For each n there is a sequential Φ n such that
Φ n (F 0 ) = 1 Φ n (F i ) = 0 if 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Proof
We will use induction on n. For n = 0 this is trivial, the constant functional Φ 0 (F ) = 1 will do. Now, let n = m + 1 and assume that Φ m is constructed as required. Define Ψ n (F, i) by
We then verify the claim by computing:
is actually P CF -definable.
We will use for the extensional ordering of finitary sequential functionals also of types 2 and 3. By Lemma 1 we have that for each n there is a -minimal Φ n such that Φ n (F 0 ) = 1 and Φ n (
The aim is to show that this sequence has no upper bound in the extensional ordering of sequential functionals.
The proof
We are now going to prove the main result of the paper; we will show that there is no upper bound for {Φ n } n∈N in the Scott model that is definable in P CF Ω . Recall that P CF Ω is a typed λ-calculus over the base types ι (for the natural numbers) and o (for the boolean values). The constants will be O : ι (for zero), S : ι → ι (for successor), P : ι → ι (for predecessor We assume that the reader is familiar with the definition of terms in P CF Ω and with the transition rules of the calculus. Each term has an interpretation over the Scott model. For constants and closed terms of base type we will not distinguish notationwise between the constant or term and the interpretation in the Scott model. For instance we used f both for the function itself and for the constant representing it. We will also use e.g.
instead of S(S(S0))
, and we will write M = N when M and N are two closed terms of base type that reduce to the same normal form via the transition rules. Plotkin [12] showed that a closed term of base type is interpreted as a number or as a boolean value if and only if it is reduced to the normal form of the object via the transition rules. We let ↓ mean terminates and ↑ mean does not terminate in this sense. We will use standard conventions for simplifying the syntax of terms. Then each therm of base type can be written in the form
where k ≥ 0. We will add F 0 , F 1 , . . . to the language of P CF Ω . They will be special constants for themselves. We extend P CF Ω with transition rules for these new constants that are abreviated as
where n > 0. E.g. the rule
Plotkin's result refered to above is still valid. P CF Ω extended with these constants and transition rules will have a deterministic top-down evaluation strategy. By the length of an evaluation we will mean the number of steps needed to obtain a normal form using this strategy. We use the sequentiality of each F n when extending the strategy to cover the F n 's and the transition rules for them. Throughout the rest of this paper, we will let z be a fixed variable of type (ι → ι) → ι. When we write M [F i ] we will always mean M with F i substituted for z. In other cases we use M x N for the result of the substitution, always assuming that problems of substitutability are handled in the standard way.
We then have 
Lemma 4 Let M be a P CF Ω -term of base type, with at most z free. If for infinitely many
n, M [F n ]↓, then ∀n∀m(M [F n ]↓ ∧M [F m ]↓⇒ M [F n ] = M [F m ]).
Proof
The proof will be by cases on the syntactical structure of M 0 . M 0 will either be a constant, the variable z or a λ-abstraction. All cases except M 0 = z will be trivial (we will follow an argument from Plotkin [12] here). The key to the argument is to show that the case M 0 = z cannot possibly occur under our assumptions.
The induction base will be the case k = 0 and M 0 being the constant 0.
we may use the induction hypothesis on the term 
Among the remaining constants in P CF Ω , we will only consider the case M 0 = ⊃ ι , since the other cases are even simpler. We proved this corollary for type 3. For higher types we use the fact that there are sequential embedding-projection pairs (π n , ν n ) between type 3 and type(n) for n > 3, so we just embed the sequence {Φ k } k∈N into the sequential functionals of type n. If Ψ is a sequential upper bound for {π n (Φ k )} k∈N , then ν n (Ψ) will be a sequential upper bound for {Φ k } k∈N , something that does not exist. In fact, if t is a pure type and t is a mixed type of at least the same level as t, we may find a sequential embedding-projection pair between the objects of type t and the objects of type t , so the result extends trivially from pure type 3 to all types of level ≥ 3.
If we view each F n as an element of the original Scott hierarchy, there will be a functional Φ such that Φ(F 0 ) = 1 while Φ(F n ) = 0 when n ≥ 1. We actually know that the minimal such Φ is P CF ++ -definable, i.e. definable in P CF extended with the non-deterministic conditional and continuous existential quantifier. However, just the non-deterministic conditional ⊃ nd will not suffice: By assumption we have that for infinitely many n, N 2 
Theorem 2 There exists an increasing sequence of sequentially defined finitary objects of pure type 3 in the Scott model such that the least upper bound is not definable in P CF
Since we are in Case 2, there will be another m (actually infinitely many) such that
and both are defined. Since F n and F m are consistent we have that
, both terminates and
For infinitely many n, at least one of N 2 [F n There is one minor extra comment to make: Let Φ be the least upper bound of the Φ n 's in the Scott model. ∃ ω will not be P CF -definable in Φ. The reason is that if this were the case, ∃ ω would itself be the least upper bound of sequential objects, which it clearly is not. However, ∃ ω is the least upper bound of objects P CF -definable in ⊃ nd , (as is every other object), so this simple argument does not show that ∃ ω is not definable in Φ and ⊃ nd . In fact, trying out some standard methods, we have not been able to prove that ∃ ω is not definable in ⊃ nd and Φ. Based on this lack of success, we offer + Ω -definable in Φ, we will have found an indication of a degreestructure of the computable objects in the Scott model relative to P CF + , or of all objects relative to P CF + Ω . An alternative problem will be to ask if there exists such a degree structure at all.
Remark 3
The counterexample in Section 2 is the main achievement of the paper. The way we found the example was by first solving the problem in a positive way for two special cases and then realizing why the proofs in these special cases could not be merged into one universal proof. The fact that infinitely many F s 's, but not all, are pairwise consistent is crucial to the construction.
